THE PRESENTLY SUCCESSFUL SWEDISH GANG REBELLION AGAINST THE LIBERAL AND NAÏVE STATE

The gangs and their warfare are creating the equivalent og “liberated areas” in the classical theory of insurgency. They are exploiting the lack of ability of the courts, social support system and police to do more than reacting to the tragic results.

To counter the problem, the Swedish authorities must apply the tools of the classical methods of counter-insurgency presented by Robert Thompson nearly 60 years ago when he extracted the lessons of the succesful campaign i Malaya. Then the central tools were an energetic campaing to generate accurate intelligence for precise intervention combined with pressure against the communities that protected the rebels plus political and economic benefits for both those communities and for the rebels that changed side.

It must be accepted that a more massive police operation even with military support will not help in itself.

These tools are necessary even if very controversial:

Forced move of families (north – Sweden is large) in forced settlement in places and environment that enhance effective survellance and control.

Effective constant and complete surveillance of the rebellious gang clusters must be sought.

Changing juvenile court procedures and decisions to support the control and intelligence effort.

Recruiting agents in the gangs and communities with guarantees of rewards, freedom from procecution and protection.

Achieving full acceptance and support from EU authorities and especially neighbouring states such as Denmark.

The alternative is continued escalation until the remaining unity of Sweden is lost.

LÆRING AF UKRAINEKRIGEN

Den 1. september, dvs. i går

svarede jeg dårligt i spørgeperioden efter et foredrag om Ukrainekrigen. Spørgsmålet drejede sig om den danske hærs læring af ukrainerne.

Det vil jeg derfor tage op i dette blog-indlæg. Det er indlysende, at vi kan og bør lære af det der er gjort godt og skidt under konflikten. Det er uansvarligt andet. Bl.a. Forsvarsakademiet og dets Hærens Officerskole samt sergentuddannelser, i hærstaben, i brigadestabene samt i regimenterne (og derefter forhåbentligt i genskabte våbenskoler) må man da selvfølgelig være i gang med at samle informationer, analyse, lære og tilpasse sig. Alt andet kan man da slet ikke forestille sig.

Lad mig her berøre nogle af de emner, der ligger lige for.

Hvordan er det lykkedes ukrainerne at føre deres brigader under presset fra konstant overvågning af droner samt elektronisk overvågning. Hvordan ser føringscentrene og deres bemanding ud, dvs. hvor store er de, med hvilke specialister ud over cheferne, med hvilke køretøjer skjult hvordan, eller i bygninger? Hvordan planlægges for kommende indsats? Hvordan kontrollerer man de forskellige enheder? Alt må ske helt anderledes, end vi normalt gør det, meget mere diskret?

Hvordan organiseres sikkerheden i felten mod udslip effektivt i en periode med intensiv droneovervågning og sociale medier?

Hvordan organiseres anvendelsen af forskellige typer af droner med artilleri under angreb og forsvar (at det sker effektivt for overvågningsdroner, kan man se på udsendte videoer)?

(Fotografiet viser angiveligt ødelagte russiske føringskøretøjer fra et kampstade)