Clemme's Blog For Critical Insight: latest posts:

It seems to be ignored by those without roots in the 1980-ties’ discourse that the main issue related to nuclear weapons from the 1950-ties onwards was how to make the weapons usable for something more than the deterrence of a general nuclear attack.

The U.S, sought to enhance the credibility of NATO’s defensive by arming the existing forces with with a very large number of Tactical Nuclear Weapons. Thereby we hoped to deter a Soviet attack without spending a large amount of money on larger conventional forces.

Likewise the leader of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, needed to free funds for the development of the economy and forced the Red Army to replace mass with nuclear weapons, mainly on missiles.

Where NATO realised the problems of assuming an automatic escalation to nuclear weapons as an early response to a Soviet Invasion, the lack of a academic-political-military exchange in Moscow meant that the Soviet General Staff war planners and staff colleges continued regarding nuclear weapons as just a more powerful type of ammunition, and only the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 and the massive follow-on cleaning operation made some realise that this view could not be sustained.

By mid-late 1970-ties the U.S. Carter Administration sought ways to extend its nuclear deterrence to Western Europe by developing a capability for “Limited Nuclear Options” different from the general and self-destructive possiblity of fighting a defensive tactical nuclear war in Europe.

When the Soviet Union modernised its intermediate range nuclear forces by deploying the SS-20 missiles, NATO decided to meet the threat of Western Europe being “de-coupled” from the U.S. strategic deterrent by deploying its own intermediate ballistic and cruise missiles, if the SS-20s were not removed.

The only place in Denmark where officials were educated in understanding nuclear issues was at the Joint Staff Course at the Royal Danish Defence College. I graduated in 1979 and soon became drawn into the hot and divisive public debate on the threat of nuclear war and human extinction that followed. My years 1981 to 1983 were spent serving as a board member of the government created Commission for Security and Disarmament Affairs dealing with nuclear weapons issues in writing, international conferences and in public discourse. After 1989 with its end of the Cold War, I hoped and assumed that I would never have to remember and use the understanding developed from ten years earlier.

However, now I am chocked by the frivolous certainty from people like the former NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh-Rasmussen, that even in an open war between Russia and the West there is no risk of escalation to use of nuclear weapons. He may have heard the the 2013 Russian Military Doctrine include nuclear weapons’ threat and use to protect gains at a lower level of conflict.

But he ignores the risk and thereby the problem of what to do if mistaken.

With my background in the period where the dominating public consern was nuclear war rather than climate change, I find that the optimistic certainty borders on madness.

As a historian I am certain that nuclear weapons will be used again – early or later – and that it is our duty to confront that risk and do our maximum to minimise that risk by accepting the possibility rather than by arrogant denial.

When an American friend noted that the rot of the Russian Army exposed in Ukraine would mean that Russia would not become a conventionel threat for twenty years, I replied:

The Russian potential is enormous. My Baltic friends have experience with that enormous power and have already been told once since 1991 by arrogant Westerners such as Americans, Brits and Germans to ignore it.

My experience with Russian officers is that they are well trained and their General Staff officer corps is very good and focused.

However, right now they are led by a corrupt, self-serving mediocrat. But I know as historian what they could do when their leader was that extremely brutal hater of inefficiency and corruption, Josif Stalin.

If such a person replaced Putin tomorrow, the Russian nation would hail him.

Hundred years ago Trotsky had taken a broken army to victory in 1 1/2 years by using zarist officers. Only the Poles were just able to beat it because of jealousy between Soviet commanders.

So if nothing happens to counter corruption and kleptocratic behaviour, you are right. And if Russia finally goes West, we shall all be right.

But if a hater of Putin’s thieving regime that is still an ardent nationalist takes over, it will take a very short time to rebuild the army using the Chinese axis to the maximum. Navalny could be that person.

This my Balts, the Poles, the Finns and the Ukrainians know. They are not like Westerners without history to inform them.

I identify the following causes:
1) Bad (echo-chamber) intelligence
2) Unsuitable unit and formation organisation for general mobile warfare, as the basic, conventional elements had been focused exclusively on limited military support of other means of waging open conflict
3) Low quality tactical leadership (no initiative, no hard-exercised combined arms tactical skills, road-bound advance, no integration of drones for reconnaissance and supplementary deep fire support)
4) Inferior training and motivation of soldiers also mirroring the character/lack of dynamic leaderby example
5) Inferior quality materiel (especially personnel carriers, drones, and trucks for the logistics tail, but also protection of tanks)

The problems are apparently much smaller in the Russian Naval Infantry and airborne troops than in the regular army units, so the analysis concentrate on the latter.

Reference 1) The echo-chamber intelligence

As we know from other cases, this problem is hardly unique to Putin’s Russia now. We just have to go back to the situation in Afghanistan last summer or Donald Rumsfeld’s record before the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

As long as Russia have a dictatorial leadership real improvement is unlikely.

Reference 2) The Battalion Task Group building block

The BTG proved far too weak to take the attrition and still operate as the traditional Russian/Soviet break-through and follow-up manoeuvre require. Its effect is also dependents on a quality of delegated command that seems to be beyond the Russian Army to achieve (except at the end of a major war as in 1946-45).

The Russian Army could probably improve its performance by returning til Motor Rifle and Tank Regiment based divisions. However, this would be a move away from the 2013 Military Doctrine focus on grey zone situations, and Russia will find it hard to create the mass required to succeed.

Reference 3) Leadership quality improvement

In order to achieve this the army needs to allow and breed initiative amongst its officers. Their education, training and character of the field exercises should change in a fundamental way away from detailed planned, “scientific” battle management military paradigm. It would require a very significant change of service culture that would probably be easier to develop and accept in the major to colonel ranks than among the junior officers. Apparently such improvement has been easier to develop in the elite naval and airborne infantry as well as spesnaz units than in the regular army.

Reference 4) Soldiers’ training and motivation

It would apparently take a major change of service culture and leadership commitment to change the “dedovshchina” treatment of conscript soldiers and make regular contract service attractive to both the soldier and his family. The war has made clear that this has not yet been anywhere near achieved in the army.

Reference 5) The weapons, etc.

I see this as the most difficult Russian challenge, as it would require not only a massive use of resources, it would have to discipline and clean-up the corruption in a lucrative part of the state sector . As a minimum they have to achieve a standardised modernisation of all main battle tanks with new defensive sensors and automatic active armour to defeat modern anti-tank weapons … in real competition between tha design bureaus. They also had to develop and integrate far better drone systems, to supply thousands of new armoured transport and combat vehicles for their infantry (motor riflemen) and to replace tens of thousands of trucks with vehicles with a far better cross-country capability. Parallel with this the air forces need to produce a large number of new sophisticated replacement aircraft and large stocks of precision munitions.

In 1918 the Finns fought and achieved independence. The German assistance proved effective.

At the end of 1918 the Baltic peoples started their fight for independence led by the Estonians. The German invasion in February 1918 had made this possible. Russian Bolsheviks invaded in December to crush the attempt as they had in Finland. However, a surge of will to fight similar to what we now see in Ukraine was nourished by the arrival of the Royal Navy off Reval (Tallinn) with moral support and weapons. Finland helped their brothers. In 1919 first a more energetic British and thereafter a determined French support chased both the Russian army and then the German mercenaries out of the emerging new Baltic Republics.

Thereafter the fight for freedom against Russian rule moved south, and with the help of French assistance the Poles broke the Soviet Russian counter-offensive at Warsaw in late summer 1920. The defeat of the Russians also meant that Western Ukraine remained part of Europe until late summer 1939 with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in autumn 1939. By June 1940 it also led to the end of the first Baltic years of independence.

When Stalin invaded Finland after a “false flag”-incident later in 1939, Western public opinion reacted as now to events in Ukraine. France and Britain – already in the “Phoney War” with Germany – sent arms assistance and prepared to exploit the situation by sending an expeditionary corps to North Scandinavia and reach the Finns. The threat of that intervention stopped the massive resumed Soviet offensive against Finland and thus saved Finland for the future.

After the Second World War Russian powed had brought control of Eastern Europe, and in 1956 the Hungarians rebelled to regain their freedom.

They were followed in 1968 by the Czechoslovakians and thereafter soon by the Poles in several waves.

We now know that in 1956 the American nuclear weapons dominance had been so total that a determined threat of war would have been likely to have forced a compromise that would probably have ended in a neutral status of Hungary similar to that of Austria.

However, in 1968 that clear dominance had ended. It was also the case in 1982, and the U.S. President, Ronald Reagan, choose a strategy of long term support for the Polish aspirations by denying the legitimacy of Soviet rule.

In 1994 and 1999 in Chechnya, in 2008 in Georgia and 2014 in Ukraine the response was indifference, denial and appeasement. Ukrainians now pay for that.

Here in 2022, Westerns states’ naïvity and unilateral disarmament, (including American in the nuclear weapons field), have removed key check pieces from the board and turned the 1956 advantage on its head.

The West has therefore been left self-emasculated and the Ukranians have joined the far too long list of heroes in the struggle against Russian imperialism.

This was developed as notes for an interview with Ole Nyeng for an article in Weekendavisen. However, the editor choose not to use any of the arguments below. Instead the article ended-up being focused on Putin-loyal citizens of Narva that hoped that they would be liberated next after the end of the “operation” against the Ukrainian “Nazis“.

1) The Bad News
• Very long borders to Russia and Belarus
• The limited “depth” of the territory from the border to the sea
• The geostrategic significance and vulnerability of Lithuania: Vilnius’ location close to the border to Belarus; Kaliningrad treatening both the coast north and the Suwalki Gap
• The very small total size of the Latvian forces in relation to the area to be defended and threat from the east and up the coast
• The full dependence on external air support
• The experience of Ukraine regarding the totalitarian warfare of the Russians

2) The Good News
• Geography’s somewhat better support for defensive operations than in Ukraine (but clearly worse than in Finland)
• That the population will act as the Ukrainian, including the clear majority of the Russian-speaking population
• Skilled and highly motivated officers in the armed forces
• The experience of Ukraine regarding the weaknesses of the Russian forces (small size and low fighting value of most infantry; low level of air force tactical and coordination skills)

3) Can they be defended now? Unfortunately only a very short time due to problems:
• The vulnerable sea lines in the southern part of the sea (Kaliningrad and potential Russian capture and use of Bornholm and/or Gotland)
• The uncertain air situation: Lack of well-located NATO bases. This gives Russian artillery the same free and dominant role as we see in Ukraine
• The lack of enough effective weapons for the forces of all three countries (especially air defence; anti-tank; numerous very long range artillery systems including long range sensors; armed drones)
• Lack of powerful Allied presence, especially American

4) What might be done quickly to improve the situation?
• Massive weapons aid to the Baltics (as to Ukraine) in exchange for them quickly developing the size of their forces (in line with the Military Assistance model from the early 1950s)
• Building American and German presence to a substantial level, meaning brigade frameworks, mainly at the Suwalki Gap
• Securing Bornholm against a coup capture (as the Swedes have secured Gotland)
• Preparation of air bases for support of Baltic Defence (best and easiest if Swedish bases were available)
• A rapid American build-up of nuclear deterrence in Europe to deter Russian coercion and limited use
• The creation of a Joint NATO Regional Baltic Sea Command under SHAPE

In 1939-40 and again i summer 1944 Finnish bravery in defence on the Karelian Istmus held in spite of massive Soviet Russian artillery bombardment. Today they would have failed.

In this winter of 2022 the cowardly president of the formerly great Russian Nation realised that the bravery of the Ukranian Nation was beyond what his ineffective soldiers could manage.

However, now the right weapon to counter raw courage was available.

A weapon that destroy the courage by killing everything alive immediately within at least a square kilometer. Like the effects of a small nuclear warhead. All killed with a combination of destroyed lungs and third degree burns.

The West experimented with the “thermobaric”/”fuel-air explosive”/”vacuum” ammunition, and I remember that it was considered a possible solution to clearing mine fields.

But the Russians developed field artillery systems for the weopon.

For the Russian corrupt cowards it was good to have this tool to counter first Chechnyan and now Ukrainian courage and raw will to resist.

The Russians used to be the carrier of a great culture. Now be they have let themselves be reduced to a mix of criminals and accomplises with only the brave few that stand up.

Let that nation freeze in isolation until it learns, regrets and compensates for the crimes against humanity they have now been responsible for in more than a century.

Nu skal forligsforhandlingerne i gang på det klart nye grundlag, som Ruslands invasion af Ukraine og åbne militære trussel mod Europa har skabt.

Mange af artiklerne her på bloggen er direkte rettet mod dette behov, og det eneste, jeg her vil tilføje som nyt forslag er at inddrage eksterne, erfarne sagkyndige i en rådgivende støttegruppe:

Både nordisk-talende fagfolk (man kunne tænke sig et par finlandssvensktalende finske generaler/admiraler)

Og respekterede danske pensionerede officerer, der er så gamle, at de har personlig erfaring med beredskabs-, mobiliserings- samt operativ og logistisk krigsplanlægning og har studeret symmetrisk forsvarskrig og afskrækkelse og har personlig erfaring fra helhedsforsvarsledelse (man kunne tænke på admiral Tim Slott Jørgensen, general Knud Bartels og kontreadmiral Jørn Olesen).

Dette opslag er for at andre kan bidrage med analyser, kommentarer og forslag.

Det er af forløbet allerede nu klart, at der straks skal findes og anvendes betydelige ekstra midler.

For at gøre deres anvendelse rimeligt rationel, skal helhedsmyndighed- og ansvar straks tilbageføres til Forsvarschefsembedet.

Der skal straks ske en forsøgsordning med uddannelse af værnepligtsenheder til Hærens reserve i konkurrence mellem tjenesteder.

Der skal ske en intensiv rekruttering af gode tidligere stampersonel, både til at fylde op i eksisterende enheder og til tjeneste som kadrer i værnepligtsuddannelsen. det

Hjemmeværnet skal udvides gennem offensiv rekruttering og lære af det ukrainske eksempel vedrørende bevæbning og uddannelse i bykamp.

De ekstra penge til materiel skal anvendes til:

1) at bygge brigadens bataljoner op til meningsfuld styrke med tre infanterikompagnier

2) at anskaffe det manglende materiel, våben og ammunition til alle tre værn, for Hæren specielt bevæbnede droner, artilleriets målopklaringsevne, og både områdeluftforsvar (en Patriot-afdeling) og nærluftforsvar til enhederne (Stinger-afløser)

Det var ikke af venlighed, at den russiske ambassadør gjorde os opmærksom på betydningen af Bornholm.

Det er ikke noget nyt, at Bornholm er militært vigtig, når langtrækkende våben stationeret på øen kan begrænse mulighederne for at sejle forbi.

Det var også tilfældet, da det amerikanske atlas, som jeg har klippet fra, blev udgivet i 1930.

I 1930 havde Sovjetunionen indledt en voldsom oprustning som forberedelse til en krig mod bl.a. Polen, Rumænien og De Baltiske Lande. Den oprustning betaltes ved eksport af korn, der blev presset ud af især ukrainske bønder, hvilket snart skabte en omfattende hungerdød i Den Ukrainske Sovjetrepublik. Forholdet til Storbritannien var blevet iskoldt, og sovjetledelsen forventede, at den britiske flåde ligesom efter 1. Verdenskrig ville støtte balterne og Polen. Det ville ske i rammen af Folkeforbundet, den tids FN, der her ville operere som forsvarsalliance, og Danmark måtte som Forbundsmedlem støtte.

I den situation blev Bornholm luft- og sømilitært vigtig for både de allierede og Sovjet.

Det var på grund af disse muligheder for at lukke for sejlads forbi Bornholm, at den nyankomne tyske besættelsesmagt i 1940 begyndte at anlægge de fire stillinger for tunge, langtrækkende kanoner ved Dueodde.

Netop i 1930 betød beliggenheden, at den danske marinestab under sin midlertidige chef, orlogskaptajn Paul Ipsen, og hans hjælper, den senere Chef for Søværnet, Aage Vedel, gennemarbejdede truslen mod øen og forsvaret af den i et krigsspil. Marinestaben så risikoen for en international konflikt i Østersøen, hvor Folkeforbundet reagerede ved at sende en flåde ind for at støtte landene her mod Sovjetunionen. Sovjetunionen landsatte i krigsspillet 2.000 mand samt en flystyrke ved Nexø for at etablere en fremskudt flybase på øen, der kunne virke mod de internationale flådestyrker, der blev sendt ind for at hjælpe Sovjetunionens modstandere. Øen blev forsvaret af 1.000 mand fra Bornholms Værn samt nogle få rekognosceringsfly og jagerfly fra det danske søværn. Den danske flådes indsats skulle muliggøre en forstærkning af styrken på øen med yderligere 2.000 mand.

Det bornholmske forsvar, Bornholms Væbning, var ganske vist blevet nedlagt ved hærordningen af 1922. Men som jeg beskrev i min 2009-artikel til Bornholmske Samlinger, lykkedes det den da nyudnævnte, energiske kommandant, oberst O.B Schousboe, at få hærledelsen og Venstre-regeringen til at acceptere etableringen af Bornholms Værn, der skulle afløse den nedlagte ”væbning” og efter mobilisering sikre et forsvar med en forstærket bataljon af øen, dvs. krigsspillets 1.000 mand.

Efter oberstens forsvarsplan var styrken fordelt med et kompagni til forsvar af hver af øens havne, herunder Nexø.

I 1920’erne havde Schousboe og hans efterfølgere søgt at få Søværnet til at se på Bornholm som en mulig fremskudt base, og de opnåede, at marinen undersøgte de bornholmske havnes muligheder og fandt mulige flyvepladser.

At det lykkedes at skabe interesse, blev bekræftet, da Marinestaben allerede i vinteren 1925 gennemførte et første krigsspil med inddragelse af Bornholm. Her havde formålet været at undersøge mulighederne for at forsvare øen med hjælp fra Sjælland, og med dette formål overførte Hæren 2.000 mand og Søværnet et par undervandsbåde, en division (dvs. tre) torpedobåde samt fly til øens forsvar. Forstærkning var også en mulighed, der blev overvejet under Den Kolde Krig, hvor der eksisterede en plan for at overføre en brigade fra Sjælland til Bornholm.

Situationen i dag – med Bornholm som svenske Gotland liggende som afgørende for mulighederne for allieret støtte til Baltikums og Polens forsvar – er blot et ekko af den tidligere situation. I øvrigt mente marineflyverne i 1930, at øen lå for langt væk fra den sovjetiske Østersøbase ved Leningrad (nu igen St Petersborg) til at være en ideel ”mellembase”. Det argument er nu irrelevant med den russiske rådighed over Kaliningrad Oblast, den nordlige del at atlassets Østprøjsen.

Den væsentlige ændring fra 1930’erne til nu er, at man ikke skal se på Bornholm som en fremskudt flybase, men en fremskudt placering af de langtrækkende luftværns- og sømålsmissiler, der med langt færre muligheder står i Kaliningrad. Det er en våbenteknisk udvikling, der gør, at et robust kupforsvar ikke alene er interessant, men afgørende vigtigt for vores allierede og nordiske venner i Østersøen. For hvis Bornholm ikke holdes, hjælper svenskernes forsvar af Gotland ikke andre end dem selv.

Michael H. Clemmesen, pensioneret brigadegeneral, historiker, chef for Bornholms Værns kampgruppe og I. Bataljon 1986-88.

(artiklen er også bragt i Bornholms Tidende)

It is both stupid and dangerous to show bullies respect, whether they are Foreign Ministers or just the local ambassador.

Open threats, rude language ignoring the standards of diplomatic communications, should bring immediate reactions.

When Russian notes threatened the recipient OSCE c-member states, they should be published immediately with the remark that the character of the communication meant that it could not be recieved or processed.

When the Russian Ambassadors to first Denmark and then Sweden openly threatened their host states in totally inappropiate form, they should be deprived of access to the local contacts, until they apologized (which would not happen, meaning that contacts dropped to lower level).

When the treatment of Macron or Liz Truss totally broke decent diplomatic standards, their continued presence was both futile and harmful to their states and the chances of promoting their cause, and they should break the meeting and leave.

Even Hitler’s diplomats knew better.

So interrupt the bullying and break. That is is only way to make Putin re-realize that he needs normal diplomacy.

Freeze contacts with the brutes and use other channels for bypass. Plenty available nowadays.

Forleden dag reagerede Forsvarsministeren (den tidligere) på oppositionens krav om at starte forhandlinger om det fremtidige forsvarsforlig allerede nu.

En sådan fremrykning afviste hun. Hun kunne ikke trække Forsvarets top væk fra “operationsrummet”, hvor de angiveligt sad og overvejede Danmarks reaktioner på den internationale krise.

Jeg ved ikke, i hvor høj grad hun og hendes rådgivere forstår, hvor latterlig hendes udtalelse var. Men lad os for at kunne forklare hvorfor og hvordan det var sort tale gå 35 år tilbage og se på, hvad forsvarsledelsen dengang drøftede i en alvorlig international krise.

Dengang ville grundlaget i en betydelig udstrækning blive givet af Forsvarets Efterretningstjenestes militærfaglige analyse af ændringer af “normalbilledet” i Østersøområdet.

Det kan man ikke længere, for FE skal ikke kunne varsle om krig og militært angreb. Hvis analysen af udviklingen i Afghanistan sidste sommer er udtryk for kvaliteten af den resterende, faglige analyse, er den bedste anvendelse af tiden ikke at lytte til Tjenesten, men tænke selv.

Dengang i sidste halvdel af 1980’erne ville Hærens chefer diskutere forberedelsen og gennemførelsen af de dengang mange niveauer af forstærkning af fredsstyrken fra indkaldelsen af “supplementet” til enhedernes lille fredsstyrke til den fulde mobilisering af hele Hæren til dennes fulde styrke på (efter min erindring) ca. 70.000 mand med “udskrivning” af civile køretøjer. Man skulle også diskutere afsendelsen af Jyske Division og resten af den danske del af LANDJUT til Holsten for at danne det fælles fremskudte forsvar af Nordtyskland-Danmark. For Sjælland skulle man overveje forberedelsen af invasionsforsvaret af østkysten ved minelægning på strandene og rydning af boligkvarterer for at kunne anlægge stillinger for de mobiliserede “kampgrupper” her. De store broer mellem øerne skulle forberedes forsvaret og klargøres ødelagt ved sprængning. Man skulle også mobilisere og klargøre de “Værtsstøtteenheder”, som Danmark skulle have klar til øremærkede allierede hærforstærkninger.

Al dette er nedlagt og glemt, og der er ingen grund til for dagens generaler at diskutere mulighederne. Hærens reserveenheder er nedlagt og materiellet væk. Ingen har erfaring i den praktiske gennemførelse af indkaldelser og klargøring af enheder.

Også Søværnet ville dengang have behov for at mobilisere og klargøre nogle ekstra enheder og give dem fuld bemanding. Derudover skulle marinestationerne kunne forsvares i samarbejde med de andre værn. Undervandsbådene skulle sendes til deres operationsområde ved Bornholm, og de store lagre af søminer skulle klargøres og senere besluttes transporteret til havne og udlagte i forskellige felter. Dette i tæt koordination med Den Tyske Forbundsmarine.

Undervandsbådene og minerne er væk, og mig bekendt har heller ikke Søværnet i dag en krigsopgave og mobiliseringsstruktur.

Flyvevåbnet skulle indkalde mobiliseringsenheder og -elementer, så flyvestationer, radarstationer og HAWK-luftværnsraketeskadriller kunne forsvares mod kup og luftangreb, og således at der var enheder, der kunne reparere flyvestationer efter angreb. Også Flyvevåbnet skulle forberede ankomsten af allierede flyforstærkninger til Danmark.

Det eneste, Flyvevåbnet stadig har tilbage fra den tid, er F-16-flyene.

Evnen til at styre denne styrkeopbygning og samtidig opbygge de ikke-militære dele af Totalforsvaret blev løbende øvet mellem de forskellige myndigheder på regionalt og statsligt niveau. Det skete under anvendelse af de forskellige “Beredskabsplaner”. Hvert andet år fra 1968 til 1989 blev også Danmarks opbygning af beredskabet øvet på tværs af NATO i rammen af de såkaldte vinterøvelser (WINTEX).

Men hele dette grundlag og den rutine er væk.

Så hvad de sidder og laver i operationsrummet nu er uklart. Ideelt sidder de og diskuterer, hvordan de skulle kunne genopbygge det tabte koordinations- og styringssystem, dvs. beredskabsplanerne.

Men for at kunne optræde logisk og økonomisk ansvarligt skulle Danmark indledningsvi opstille og prioritere de opgaver, som dansk forsvar naturligt har i forsvaret af Danmark ved Østersøens vestlige del og Rigsfælleskabets territorier i Nordatlanten og Arktis. Herudover skulle man fastlægge bidrag til det fælles NATO-forsvar i Østersøen på og fra Bornholm samt nu fremskudt i Baltikum og Polen.

Det sidste må ses som en fortsættelse af det tidligere forsvar i LANDJUT-området. Hovedkvarteret blev senere som det polsk-tysk-danske MNCNE flyttet til Szczecin i Polen.

En sådan opstilling af Forsvarets opgaver i et samarbejde mellem forsvarspolitikerne og fagkundskaben skete senest i 1988-89 under den daværende forsvarskommissions arbejde. Også nye formuleringer skal naturligt både dække opgaver i fredstid, i krisetid og under krig.

Det sidste efter den så igen planlagte opbygning af fredsstyrken, da danske enheder nu ikke er organiseret til at kunne løse opgaver i en symmetrisk konfrontation og krig.

Først når disse opgaver er opstillet og prioriteret kan man gå til for det første at diskutere mulighederne for at løse dem og for det andet valgt den myndigheds- og ansvarsorganisation, der skal lede opbygningen. Først derefter er der for det tredje en mulighed for at styre anvendelsen af ekstra penge rationelt.

Vi kan som nævnt håbe, at det er, hvad de mødende generaler og admiraler nu diskuterer, så de er forberedte til at kunne diskuterer emnerne med forsvarspolitikerne.

Hvorfor tror jeg ikke på, at det er tilfældet?