THE THREAT AGAINST THE BORDERS AND KEY AREAS SUCH AS CAPITALS AND MAIN PORTS
(billedet er fra Setomaa, det sydøstlige Estland ved grænsen til Rusland ved Pskov)
The Baltic States’ borders to Russia, Belarus and the Kaliningrad Oblast of Russia are more that 1.200 kms long. However the Peipus and Pskov Lakes between Estonia and Russia means that the most exposed parts are only of roughly 1.000 kms. A significant part of the borders are wooded meaning both that surveillance and effective direct weapon are limited in range and that easy advance of mechanised forces is hampered outside roads.
Of the three capitals Vilnius is placed close to the Belarus Border and thus most vulnerable to over-land coup and bombardment (even by field artillery). Tallinn as well as the western Courland Ports of Liépaja and Ventspils are exposed to the risks of coup by both air and sea landings, Riga may be attempted taken by an air landing in the air port.
The east-west extension of the states is limited making the western coast reachable within one-two days of a break-through at the eastern borders. This limitation means that supporting air force elements are best based further away in places such as Sweden.
BACKGROUND OF THE NOTES
The background is first and foremost my practical service as combat troops and staff officer during the Cold War with various defence missions, both coastal/island defence and defending at the northern end of the Inner German Border.
Various tactical courses from battalion to army corps level, especially the lecturing at the army general staff course by Jørgen Lyng, then Lieutenant Colonel, later General. Lyng made certain that we all understood in depth the possibilities and limitations of units.
Service in Baltic States 1994-2004 that included a defence reconnaissance of the border areas and several later visits to the key sectors.
A continuous study of the post-2022 Ukrainian war with Russia to extract lessons relevant for Baltic defence.
THE MISSIONS AND MAXIMUM POTENTIAL OF COMBAT BRIGADES
The notes assumes brigades of 3-4 combat battalions of each 3-4 infantry companies/tank squadrons; a long range 155 mm howitzer battalion; a combat engineer company; a combat drone company large enough to give drone platoons to battalions and keep a powerful central drone pool; an anti-air/anti drone battery; a logistics battalion; a field hospital and ambulance unit.
The maximum occupied frontage of such a brigade (with three combat battalions with each three subunits in front) is approximately 20 kms (with nine subunits in positions), less if closely wooded area, more if an area well prepared with deep fortified positions and obstacles to movement and with few roads crossing the border.
With the actual character of the Baltic States’ eastern and southern borders, it is assumed that it will be sufficient to create a “low troop density” defence with the Ukrainian type of deep drone surveillance and armed drone and artillery attrition of any advancing Russian formation. The brigade combat elements will be concentrated around roads. Areas between brigade sectors and battalion defence positions covered by drone equipped territorial defence forces manning deep fortified and dense obstacle rich positions. Brigades in reserves ready to take-over any such sectors if they comes under attack and taking-over from worn-out forward brigades.
The main problem now is that the number of Baltic States’ own and other brigades remains far from the minimum required to defend the capitals, etc. and creating a minimum defence of the most likely Russian invasion routes.
HOW TO PREPARE
The first step to take is of course to identify the most likely (worst case) Russian options and border invasion routes to the capitals and onwards to the Courland west coast.
The next step is to conduct a thorough reconnaissance of each brigade sector with battalion and subunit cadres developing a plan down to each platoon position, every fortified position, every obstacle, use of drones and fires.
The third step is to war-game the plan to identify weaknesses to be removed by changes.
The fourth is to conduct logistics, personnel and medical exercises and personnel replacement from brigade back to home country to develop workable structures and procedures.
OTHER DEFENCE ISSUES RELATED TO BALTIC DEFENCE
(to be developed)
Air cover of the Baltics
Sea Lines of Communications to the Baltics and Bornholm/Gotland.
Missile defence of home countries.
Luftforsvaret af Baltikum
Truslen mod hjemlandet