Since February 2022 I have wondered about the extremely limited span of the Danish decisions to rearm.
This especially when compared to the far broader and comprehensive rearmament from 1950 to 1954 in the first years of the Cold War that I studied as historian.
Part of the difference then and now is based on the very different and larger Alliance 1950s contributions. It consisted in professional education in U.S. courses for the Danish defence cadres, in large-scale arms assistance and in the common Alliance infrastructure programs.
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Here I explain how I have concluded Danes (if at all) now think about future war, NATO and military forces.
What I have extracted is awkward and may not be the full understanding. However, to be changed, it must be confronted and proven as both incorrect and shameful.
Let me start with a to me chocking experience from the early 1980s. I had been briefing Erhard Jakobsen, the party leader of the “Centre Democrats”, on the plans for the defence of the Denmark-North German Command (BALTAP) area.
During the briefing I had covered the combined land defence of the Schleswig-Holstein region by the combined forces of the powerful 6th German Mechanized Division, of very powerful German Local Defence formations, and of Danish Army Forces, centered on the Jutland Division and adding-up to fifty percent of the then Danish field army forces.
It was Jakobsen’s reaction that chocked me. He made clear that he did not accept that Danish Army forces could contribute with real defence power. Neither had he grasped that the forces of powerful Germany were now on our side.
He was deeply surprised when I made clear that Denmark had responsibility for a sector of the common NATO front-line defenses. He wondered how I could believe that Danish Army forces would contribute with military effect to the common deterrence and defence.
I shall come back to how Erhard Jakobsen’s views are important to understand what happens now.
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The classical Danish experience of wars and their implications is a divided in two.
Firstly the totally dominant view among Danish civilian intellectuals after the defeats of 1807, 1864 and 9. april 1940 was that the small power Denmark’s independent efforts at military actions were hopeless and a harmful waste of time and resources.
Secondly the experience of 1919, 1945, 1990 that in spite of a half-hearted Danish contribution, big friends would save us by sacrificing their lives, wealth and efforts.
Finally, the classical experience was supplemented in 1992-2012. Here Denmark felt good by contributing to a great friend’s humanitarian or state building operations in the Greater Middle East. The contributions normally happened with nearly full political support that included groupings previously highly critical of anything military.
The contributions only employed personnel on volunteer contracts.
For more than twenty-five years, conscription service was only used for attracting soldiers to sign regular contracts. It was no longer used to create reserve units and soldiers, and twenty years ago all reserve units were disbanded.
Thereafter no serving officer or NCO got personal experience with the creation of conscript units and their potential for military excellence. Neither did they get experience with the planning and preparation of high-intensity war.
During the last 25-30 years the Danish Army cadre became convinced of the Anglo-Saxon dogma that contract manned units were far better that conscripted ones. It was a clear break with my generation that knew from experience that this is neither true nor relevant in a situation, when mass and endurance in battle was essential when general war threatened and needed to be deterred.
The arrogant dogma was reinforced by the regular soldiers’ strong trade unions, and blocked the ability to learn from the past of countries like Finland or the warfighting Ukraine.
The blind dogma remains convincing to a generation of now senior military officers – and to some degree – to defence politicians with no or very short personal military training experience.
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Then the post-winter 2022-rearmament started.
Gradually resources were made available for an intensive military shopping spree buying everything from new rifles to new navy ships. Later money was found for repairing rotten infrastructure and for acquiring drones and their centrally organised testing. Drones were recognised by both amateurs and professionals as essential in future conflicts.
It was also decided that conscription should be for both/all sexes, more conscripts would be called-up, and service time should be extended to a minimum of 11 months for privates and 22 months for sergeants and reserve lieutenants.
However, no information has emerged on how the new conscription will be used beyond enhancing recruitment. I have seen no indication of any learning from the deep Danish conscription crisis half-way through the Cold War. I have seen no indication of preparations for the creation of reserve units and a personnel replacement system. There are no indications that the current military legal and discipline code may need adjustment. Clearly, the new force build-up and conscription is unserious.
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On the basis of all this, I conclude:
There is no realization that the possibility of an early major war with Russia is real.
Currently, Denmark is not urgently preparing for major war as we did in the early 1950s (then with both military and civil defence). However, this is not broadly understood.
That 1950s insight that Denmark must use conscription to create large reserves for the common defence of NATO area is currently ignored.
That there is no chance that Danes or other Europeans with be saved by the U.S. this time. However, we chose to trust a miracle and whenever a commentator is considering the possibility of a Russian action against NATO territory, this is ignored.
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Rather than doing what is now urgently required, namely conducting a modernised version of the 1950-54 style rearmament, Denmark will today respond to the threatening defeat of own and other European forces at NATO’s eastern borders in pragmatic adjustment to Russian power – as it did to Germany in 1940-43.
As Erhard Jakobsen had always thought, Denmark in isolation – as a small country – had no other options than appeasement. He apparently considered his countrymen to be without any sensible military options, and saw honour and fighting spirit as irrelevant and dangerous bravado.
As a life time, professional soldier and historian, and an observer of what Finland and most recently Ukraine has achieved against much stronger aggressive neighbours, I must conclude otherwise. But what we have seen the last three years supports the view of Erhard Jakobsen that Danmark has no military options, and illustrates that neither the armed forces nor the leading politicians see that otherwise.
In SDU Rector Jens Ringsmose’s Ph.D.-thesis many years later, he indirectly confirmed Jakobsen’s view that Danish politicians considered the Danish Armed Forces’ military contributions as rather irrelevant for Danish Security. The only important issue was merely the size of the defence budget. Its size should be large enough to prevent the U.S. Copenhagen Embassy from protesting publicly.
With the U.S. no longer a trustworthy Ally, Denmark is in reality actively limiting its options and those of the rest of Europe to that of retreat, surrender and submission to the type of subordinated semi-slavery that my Baltic, Polish and Ukrainian friends experienced until 1991.